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1.  Introduction
In a ‘knowledge-based’ society, much attention needs to be given to the role of
universities in contributing to technical change and economic growth. Indeed, science,
technology and educational policies may well be argued to be the heart of any
government efforts to promote economic transformation. However, although Marx
argued that science had become a powerful productive force as early as in the 19
th
century, our knowledge of the behaviour of universities, of the interactions between
these and industry and how to measure the value of academic research is still quite
limited. Policies are therefore, as in other fields, based on beliefs about ‘how things
work’ and on the relative strengths of various pressure groups. In the following, we
will attempt to come to grips with what we know, what we do not know and what
questions may be worth pursuing; in particular with respect to emerging knowledge
fields. The purpose of this paper is, thus, to make a selective and interpretative review
of the very large literature on university-industry relations with the aim of identifying
questions for further research.
In section two, we will provide the ‘bare bones’ of an analytical framework for
approaching university-industry relations in that we make explicit our view of the
innovation process, the role of the universities in that process, and how it may differ
between knowledge fields and over geographical regions. In the following three
sections, we address three themes with a strong bearing on science and educational
policy. Discussing these themes, we will refer to the Swedish situation as much as
possible. In section three, we discuss how to measure the size and performance of
academic research. Here, we take our point of departure in a current Swedish policy
debate. The next theme, dealt with in section four, is assessing the value of academic
R&D where we discuss a number of sources of uncertainty and what these may mean
for policy. The final theme is improving the value of the academic sector where we
deal with the issue of ‘responsiveness’; i.e. how rapidly universities react, in terms of
both research and education, to the emergence of new knowledge fields and how it
may vary depending on governance structures and other factors. The final section
contains a specification of a set of questions that need further research.4
2. Universities and the innovation process – a broad framework
2.1 Introduction
Any enquiry into the relationship between universities and the transformation of
industry needs to be clear about how the innovation process, and the role of the
universities therein, is conceptualised. This section sets out to do so. We begin by
outlining the relationship between the ‘chain-link’ model of the innovation process
and that of innovation systems, arguing that these are complementary. We then
propose that it is useful to analyse the workings of innovation systems by focusing on
a set of functions that need to be performed if a system is to perform well. One
provider of these functions is the university. There are various mechanisms through
which the benefits of academic R&D can accrue to industry (i.e. how universities can
contribute to functionality) and these benefits lie less in codified ‘results’ as in access
to capabilities and tacit knowledge. The benefits of academic R&D are often,
therefore, localised. The extent of these benefits, and the manner in which they are
reaped, depend on the nature of the (regionally constrained) innovation system in
which universities form a part as well as the character of the specific innovation
process in various knowledge fields.
2.2. The chain link model, innovation systems and functional analysis
The innovation process is still often seen as a flow ‘down a one-way street’ (Kline
and Rosenberg, 1986, p. 285) where research leads to development, development to
production, and production to marketing. As has been noted by many, there are
serious shortcomings in this conceptualisation of the innovation process.
1 Perhaps the
most important are the lack of feedback paths, an associated unidirectional view of the
causal relationships, and a simplistic view of the role of science (Kline and
Rosenberg, 1986).
Feedback is essential, and takes place between users and suppliers, between various
phases in the design process, between production and design and between all these
and science. The relationship between science and design is complex in that some
designs are made without a corresponding science base, whereas other design5
developments spur scientific enquiries (i.e. the interaction goes both ways)
2 and yet in
other cases, scientific advances lead to new designs. Finally, where science is
involved in design development, the bulk of the knowledge used refers to the
accumulated stock and the results from current research form but a small part of the
whole.
The ‘chain-link model’ developed by Kline and Rosenberg (1986) considers the
above features of the relationship between science, technology and market and
provides us with a useful conceptual starting point for studying the relationship
between university and industry. Two features of the model stand out. First, science is
not seen as the initiator of change but is visualised as being parallel to the
development and marketing process – to be used when needed. It is only when
accumulated science fails to solve problems arising at any point in the innovation and
diffusion process that research is undertaken. Second, there are many pathways, not
only one. These are:
•  Potential market￿analytic design￿detailed design￿
redesign￿produce￿distribute and market
•  Feed back loop from ‘distribute and market’ to ‘potential market’ and between
all the other phases
•  Reference to accumulated science, and if that fails, to research, from any of
the stages
•  New products opening up for new science (e.g. the microscope)
•  New science leading to new designs (e.g. genetic engineering)
The model suggests that the role of universities in technical change should not be seen
as limited to pursuing research ‘at the frontier’ but, instead, a central function is to
make accumulated knowledge available as and when there is a need for it; the
university could be seen as a reservoir of knowledge. This reservoir is, of course,
transferred primarily through teaching, at both the undergraduate and the graduate
levels, but transfer also takes place in various fora where industry meets academia. In
these fora, moreover, information and knowledge flow in both directions for at least
two reasons. First, basic and applied research is undertaken outside of academia
(indeed, in some areas, industry dwarfs academia, see Granberg and Stankiewicz,6
1981) and, second, problems encountered ‘downstream’ play an important role in
guiding work ‘upstream’.
Only implicitly are there, however, actors such as universities or capital goods
producers in the model. Nor are there networks through which interactions are
conducted, or institutions regulating behaviour, or mechanisms through which
university interacts with industry. In order to help us improve our understanding of
what shapes the formation of the accumulated knowledge base, the links between
different phases in a particular country or region, and ultimately the role of
universities in technical change, we need to add an innovation system approach to that
of the ‘chain-linked model’.
While there are many related innovation system approaches, let us use a technology
specific one as it focuses on competences and knowledge, which seems particularly
appropriate when the object of enquiry is the universities and their links to industry. A
technological system is defined as (Carlsson and Stankiewicz (1991, p. 21):
  “…network(s) of agents interacting in a specific technology area under a particular
institutional infrastructure for the purpose of generating, diffusing, and utilizing
technology. Technological systems are defined in terms of knowledge and
competence flows rather than flows of ordinary goods and services.”
A technological system is made up of three main elements:
3
Actors and their competences, technical as well as others. These may be firms or other
organisations.  A particularly important set of actors is ‘prime movers’ or system
builders (Hughes, 1983). These are firms, or other actors, which are technically,
financially and/or politically so powerful that they can strongly influence the
development and diffusion process. For instance, a prime mover may be a ‘lead user’
providing suppliers with feedback on existing products and ideas for new products.
Other notable actors are those that form bridges between academia and industry and
those shaping the science and educational policy of a country or region.
Networks that constitute important channels for the transfer of both tacit (Metcalfe,
1992) and explicit knowledge. Networks may be conducive to the identification of
problems and of the development of new technical solutions. They may also be7
conducive to a more general diffusion of information. Being strongly integrated into a
network increases the resource base of the individual firm, and other actors, in terms
of gaining access to information and knowledge. The network also influences
perceptions of what is desirable and possible, in that it shapes our images of the
future, which in turn guide specific decisions, be they in firms or in other
organisations.
Institutions, which stipulate the norms and rules regulating interactions between
various actors (Edquist and Johnson, 1997) and define the value base of various
segments in society.  The roles of institutions vary: some influence the connectivity in
the system whereas others influence the incentive structure. Yet others may shape the
governance structure of the higher educational sector. As is emphasised in
institutional economics (e.g. Edquist and Johnson, 1997), and in the literature on
innovation systems (e.g. Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991; Porter, 1998), institutions
are important not only for the specific path a technology takes but also for the
transformation of industry.
Technological systems are, of course, not static but inherently dynamic and unstable.
The dynamics can be viewed as a function of a tension between the logic of
technology and the nature of actors, networks and institutions. Any change in one
component in the system may trigger a set of actions and reactions that relieve the
tension and propel the system forward. The boundaries, in terms of both actors and
knowledge, may consequently alter, sometimes quite rapidly (Carlsson et al., 2002).
The approach, thus, assumes that the emergence of new technologies, and the
subsequent transformation of industry, does not take place in a vacuum but rather
through a dynamic interplay between firms and other organizations, such as
universities, industrial associations and government bodies; and that the nature of the
institutional framework heavily influences the process. In this, the approach
underlines the many and complex links depicted in the ‘chain-link’ model, but adds an
understanding of what shapes the nature of the links and the accumulated knowledge
base in a particular country or region.8
2.3 Functions in an innovation system and the mechanisms which influence
functionality
A useful way of analysing the emergence and diffusion of a new technology is to
focus on how a set of functions is performed (Johnson and Jacobsson, 2002, Rickne,
2000). These functions constitute an intermediate level between the components of a
technological system and the performance of the system. An extensive review of the
innovation system literature (Johnson and Jacobsson, 2001, Bergek, 2002), suggests
that there are five basic functions that need to be performed in a technological
system:
4
•  Create and diffuse ‘new’ knowledge
•  Influence the direction of search processes among users and suppliers of
technology. This function includes guidance with respect to the growth
potential of a new technology, which may be closely linked to the legitimacy
of it, and guidance in relation to choice of specific technology.
•  Supply of resources of both general nature such as capital, competence and
input materials and those which are intimately linked to the specific
innovation and the actor’s receiver competence.
•  Create positive external economies, an example of which is the formation of
buyer-seller linkages or networks that provide ‘spill-over’ effects by the
synergetic creation of knowledge, reduction of uncertainty, guiding the search
process, reducing the cost of information, accessing tacit knowledge and
sharing of costs
•  Form markets since innovations rarely find ready-made markets, but these
need to be stimulated or even created. This process may be affected by firms’
marketing efforts but also by government actions to clear legislative obstacles
and by the measures of various organisations to legitimise the technology.
The functions are not, of course, independent of one another and a change in one
function may lead to changes in other functions (Rickne, 2000; Johnson and
Jacobsson, 2001). For instance, the creation of an initial market may influence the
direction of the search process and lead to entry by new firms that bring new
resources to the industry. The linkages between functions may also be circular, which
may set in motion a virtuous circle, or a process of cumulative causation (Myrdal,
1957). For instance, the resources brought into the industry by a new entrant may be
used to develop the market further.
5 Powerful virtuous circles lie at the heart of an
expanding technological system but it may be extremely difficult to set them in
motion. For instance, in the case of the technological system related to the generation,
diffusion and use of solar cells in Germany, two decades passed between the initiation9
of large R&D programmes and the emergence of a process of cumulative causation
(Jacobsson, et al. 2002).
There are two main reasons for analysing dynamics in functional terms rather than
purely in terms of the dynamics of each of the components of the technological
system. First, there is no reason to expect a particular configuration of a technological
system, or structure, to be related to the performance of the system in a clear and
unambiguous way. By arranging our empirical material in terms of functions, we can
trace the way in which a particular entry/exit pattern, actor combination or a specific
institutional set-up
6 shapes the generation, diffusion and utilisation of new
technology. Second, we can define the border of the system, an inherently very
difficult task (Carlsson et al. 2002), by analysing what promotes or hinders the
development of these functions (Johnson and Jacobsson, 2001).
7
In summary, we have a framework that provides us with a tool for analysing the
dynamics of a technological system through capturing not only how the functional
pattern of an innovation system evolves, but also the extent to which virtuous circles
exist and what factors and actors shape the process.
One of these actors is the universities, which can contribute to all of the functions
listed above. ‘Create and diffuse knowledge’ refers not only to the pursuit of
groundbreaking research but also to the diffusion of knowledge from the accumulated
stock in the world.  A university can influence ‘the direction of search processes’ in
industry through enlarging the technological opportunity set, by examining PhDs in
new fields, by demonstrating the usefulness of a specific design approach etc. The
role of the universities in the ’Supply of resources’ may refer to the supply of an
adequate volume of both undergraduates and graduates in a particular knowledge
field, e.g. electronics, or, a more detailed field, in microwave technology. It may also
refer to the supply of capital, in particular seed capital and other essential resources
for spin-off firms. Universities can help to prepare the ground for the ‘Creation of
positive external economies’ by providing meeting places, and through participating
in various types of bridging organisations and in joint R&D with industry. Finally, the
universities can contribute to the ‘formation of markets’ by being an innovative
customer, for instance in instrumentation.10
Hence, at the general level, we can conceptualise the role of the universities in the
innovation and diffusion process as a provider a whole range of functions.
8
As hinted at above, there are various mechanisms by which universities may perform
these functions and the influence can be both direct and indirect. Some of these
mechanisms are listed below (Meyer-Krahmer and Schmoch, 1998; Pavitt, 1998;
Salter and Martin, 2001).
 9 The first three refer to the traditional mechanisms of
publishing and of teaching. The fourth and fifth emphasise the role of various types of
networks, meeting places and markets for the sharing of information and knowledge
whereas the last two point to the development of products and firms by academics.
•  Scientific publications which expand the technological opportunity set of
firms
•  Training of engineers and natural scientists
•  Training of PhDs with its essential provision of background knowledge, skills
and personal networks
•  Participating in common informal networks, joint R&D projects, research
funding and contract research with an associated sharing of explicit and tacit
knowledge (gained through research and being members of national and
international professional networks)
•  Linking national firms to international networks and providing access to
explicit and tacit knowledge from a wider range of sources
•  Development of instruments and engineering design tools
•  Spinning off technology-based firms
It would seem reasonable to divide these into primary, secondary and tertiary
mechanisms. The primary one is research, the secondary is teaching at PhD and
undergraduate levels, while the tertiary mechanisms refer to the remaining ones.
Taken jointly, it is through all these mechanisms that academic research increases the
rate of return of private, more applied R&D.
10Without high quality capabilities in
research, academics will not be able to provide such a meaningful contribution to
industry and society, even if the remaining mechanisms are employed.11
Implicit in the list, is that there are many types of benefits accruing from academic
research and these go far beyond providing new information of a public good  nature
but include: diffusion of tacit knowledge, access to a pool of highly skilled labour,
provision of background knowledge,
11 assistance with experimentation, formation of
networks etc. In an authoritative review, Salter and Martin (2001, p. 528) underline
that “…these benefits are often subtle, heterogeneous, difficult to track or measure
and mostly indirect (our italics).”
In a rare study which traces the mechanisms used, and the benefits of academic R&D
in three knowledge fields, Faulkner and Senker (1994) conclude that: “In particular,
our approach privileges the role of informal linkages; flows of tacit knowledge; and
the wider contribution of public sector research to industrial innovation through the
literature and training”. Pavitt (1991, 2001) and Salter and Martin (2001) point to
skilled graduates as the main mechanism through which the benefits of research flow
into industry.
12
Yet, the public debate has recently focussed more on the last mechanism (formation
of firms) and on the associated issues of patenting, incubators and seed funding
related to the ‘entrepreneurial university’ (see e.g. Etzkowitz et al, 2000). Whereas it
is clear that substantial (and well motivated) changes have been made to improve the
functioning of this mechanism, it is nevertheless only one of many, but perhaps one of
the easier to measure. An appropriate science policy needs to scrutinize the
functioning of all the mechanisms, including those, which are less easy to track, and
which clearly are of great importance to industry.
2.4 Spatial and knowledge specific interactions between university and industry
The emphasis on training, tacit knowledge and indirect benefits, rather than codified
information (or even products) as the main output of academic research suggests that
there may be a strong spatial dimension
13 in the distribution of those benefits. As
Pavitt (1998, p. 797) puts it:
“…the main practical benefits of academic research are not easily
transmissible information, ideas and discoveries available on equal12
terms to anyone in the world. Instead, they are various elements of
problem-solving capacity, involving the  transmission of often tacit
(i.e., non-codifiable) knowledge through personal mobility and face-
to-face contacts. The benefits therefore tend to be geographically and
linguistically localised.”
Similar conclusions are drawn in other studies on university-industry interaction (e.g.
Hicks et al. 2001; Blind and Grupp, 1999; Mansfield and Lee, 1996; Salter and
Martin, 2001) as well as in the vast literature on ‘spill-overs (e.g. Anselin et al. 1997).
This literature could be seen as a sub-group of the larger literature on regional and
national innovation systems where a key element is a set of spatially constrained
externalities mediated through market or non-market mechanisms and governed by a
specific institutional set-up (e.g. Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1991; Lundvall, 1992;
Saxenian, 1994; Edquist, 1997, Carlsson; 1997; Rickne 2000; Holmen, 2001).
The extent to which, and how, universities contribute to functionality would,
therefore, be expected to depend on the context in which they are placed (in addition
to factors internal to the university); i.e. on the nature of the spatially constrained
innovation system. Clearly, there are features in the specific technological systems
which should be expected to be influential (Faulkner and Senker, 1994; Meyer-
Krahmer and Schmoch, 1998). Some obvious factors would be the R&D strength of
the relevant industry (greater strength leads to more interaction); the size structure of
firms (larger firms may lead to more formal interaction); science and educational
policies (e.g. the size of funding and the orientation of funding) which affect the
strength of the academic research base and the quality and volume of ‘output’ of
graduates in particular fields; the existence of a developed venture capital market; the
functioning of various bridging institutions and the prevalent values as regards
industry-academia collaboration. Hence, any analysis of the benefits of academia, and
the mechanisms through which these benefits flow, need to include a whole range of
features in the surrounding innovation system.
In addition to varying across space, we would also expect the extent to which, and
how, universities contribute to technical change is likely to differ between knowledge
fields (Faulkner and Senker, 1994; Salter and Martin, 2001).13
The ways in which innovations are generated vary between industries (Kline and
Rosenberg, 1986). They may differ in several dimensions and we probably do not
have enough knowledge of the diversity involved. A dimension, which has received
much attention lately, is the science dependency of innovations (Narin et al., 1997;
Meyer-Krahmer and Schmoch, 1998; Meyer, 2000; Hicks et al., 2001; Tijssen et al.,
2000 and Tijssen, 2002). This is usually measured by the frequency of references to
scientific publications in patent applications and shows very distinct differences
between various knowledge fields. Biotechnology, pharmaceuticals and
semiconductors rank highest whereas civil engineering and many mechanical
engineering fields rank among the lowest (Meyer-Krahmer and Schmoch, 1998).
This is not to be construed as science-based technologies following a linear model of
development (where there is a direct link between scientific development and
technical change), but only as science figuring prominently as an input into the
process; the relationship is, again, more likely to be indirect than direct. As Meyer
(2000, p. 425) concludes from an in-depth study of a small number of patents in nano-
technology:
“The evidence…supports the view that there is a general connection between science
and technology, but points out that citation linkages hardly represent a direct link
between cited paper and citing patent ... Scientific findings are important background
knowledge playing an important indirect rather than direct role”.
A related dimension is whether the innovation process is discovery or design driven
(or rather, where on a continuum a knowledge field is placed; Granberg and
Stankiewicz, 2001). A research-based discovery driven process can be seen in
virtually all biotechnologies and in many material technologies as well as in some
energy technologies (Granberg and Stankiewicz, 2001). The search process is
opportunity driven and takes place within poorly articulated ‘design spaces’, it is
highly empirical and prone to serendipitous discoveries. A design driven process is
more often demand driven and takes place within a well articulated design space
where problems are solved though what Kline and Rosenberg (1986) call ‘analytic
design’. Mechanical and electrical engineering as well as computer science operate
largely under this design regime.14
Hicks et al.’s (2001) careful analysis of patent data gives support for the relevance of
this dimension. It shows that patenting in information technology has a very different
pattern to that of health sciences, in that the former does not refer much to science, it
refers to technology which is on average newer than the science it cites and the
technical documentation cited is often non-research technical work. Meyer-Krahmer
and Schmoch (1998) similarly argue that the cognitive structure in knowledge
generation varies between fields and that mechanical engineering, in contrast to
chemistry and electronics, has tangible artefacts, which are open to direct, experience
based, manipulation and where much work is geared towards the optimisation of
products and processes. This should, again, not necessarily be construed as suggesting
that the relationship between industry and university is necessarily weak in
mechanical engineering, but that the mechanisms used may be different.
Available empirical evidence also suggests that there is a considerable difference in
the nature of the relationship between university and industry in scientific fields,
technologies and industries (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986; Faulkner and Senker, 1994;
Rosenberg and Nelson, 1994; Meyer-Krahmer and Schmoch, 1998; Rappert et al.
1999; McMillan et al., 2000). For instance, Faulkner and Senker (1994) argue that
differences in the extent of university-industry in three knowledge fields
(biotechnology, ceramics and parallel computing) can be, at least partly, explained by
the nature of the innovation process (engineering design versus science) where the
latter two fields are less reliant on links to universities and more dependent on other
firms in the supply chain (e.g. the importance of feedback from the users of ceramics
is very important). Formal linkages in terms of R&D contracts and literature scanning
are relatively more important in biotechnology, whereas in parallel computing,
informal linkages and personal contacts matter more. In the public sector, research
acts as both the customer and a supplier of specific knowledge.
McMillan et al. (2000) and Rickne (2000) underline the role of close links with
academic research in biotechnology; citations of (public sector) basic research figure
prominently in patents, many firms are spin-offs from universities and a range of
formal and informal links tie academia closely to industry.15
Meyer-Krahmer and Schmoch (1998) analysed university-industry interaction in five
different fields (production technology, microelectronics, software, biotechnology and
chemistry) and found that overall, collaborative research and informal contacts were
most important. In line with the argument above, they conclude that: “Obviously,
industrial researchers have become members of informal networks wherein academic
as well as industrial researchers discuss their research projects and findings” (Meyer-
Krahmer and Schooch, 1998, p. 841). There are, however, differences between the
respective fields in the importance of various mechanisms; in mechanical engineering,
the main mechanism used is contract research to solve specific technical problems,
whereas in chemistry, the provision of personnel and education is the most important
mechanism.
Clearly, therefore, there is a considerable difference in the pattern of interaction in
different knowledge fields. The precise reasons for these patterns are, however, not
fully known, but are presumably to be found in a combination of knowledge and
spatial specific features.
To conclude, we conceptualise the role of the universities as a contributor to a set of
functions, the fulfilment of which shapes the evolution of technological system(s) and
their performance. The mechanisms employed to benefit industry are many as are the
types of benefits. The benefits are often subtle, difficult to trace and measure, and
mostly indirect. Both the benefits and the mechanisms used would be expected to vary
depending on the specific knowledge fields and on the nature of the technological
system(s) in which the universities form but a part.
In the next sections, we will explore three themes of specific relevance to the science
policy debate in Sweden. The first refers to problems associated with measuring the
strength of the academic sector. This is, as we shall see in the case of Sweden, an
important issue as misspecification of the strength (or weakness) would be expected
to influence our perception of the main research questions and policy issues. The
traditional, and the core functions, of the universities, is to develop knowledge and to
train engineers and scientists. Science policy shapes the evolution of the knowledge
base and the formation of capabilities and, therefore, shapes what can be developed
(in terms of technology, products and firms) or transferred via formal or informal16
links. The second theme is the inherent difficulties involved in assessing the value of
academic research, and how various ways of assessing it may shape the quality and
variety of the knowledge and capabilities generated in the academic sector. The third
theme is highly related to the second one, as it explores the speed and the strength by
which universities develop knowledge and capabilities in new fields, i.e. their
‘responsiveness’.
3. Measuring the size and performance of academic R&D - to what
extent is Swedish academia a ‘powerhouse’
Sweden is seen as a top-performing nation in terms of academic research (e.g. Salter
et al. 2000; Sörlin and Törnvist, 2000). Indeed, Sweden has recently been labelled an
academic ‘powerhouse’ (Goldfarb and Henrekson 2002).
The Swedish share of academic R&D in GDP is the highest in the world (Pavitt,
2001, Salter et al., 2001, table 5) and about double that of the average of the OECD
countries (Henrekson and Rosenberg, 2000). Likewise, Sweden is in the top few (no.
2 and far above countries such as Germany) in terms of the number of scientific
articles published (in science and engineering) set in relation to GDP (Henrekson and
Rosenberg, 2000; Vinnova, 2001) as well as in terms of how often these articles are
cited, an indicator of the quality of R&D (Lattimore and Revesz, 1996;
14 Vinnova,
2001; Pavitt, 2001).
Recently, these observations were used as the starting point for a discussion which
contrasts this apparent strength of Swedish academia with poor performance in terms
of technology based entrepreneurship, a weak high technology sector, and poor
economic growth (Sörlin and Törnqvist, 2000; Henrekson and Rosenberg, 2000 and
Goldfarb and Henrekson, 2002). Much of the analysis focuses on the lack of
incentives to exploit university generated knowledge. In particular, Henrekson and
Rosenberg (2000) provide a thorough discussion of a set of problems with the
incentive structure in Sweden, especially in relation to university-based
entrepreneurship. They also raise the issue of how well the fairly recently created
mechanisms for the ‘transfer’ of technology to industry may work, as compared to
more spontaneous interactions generated in innovation systems with a more17
decentralised and competitive university system combined with greater incentives to
exploit technology through start-ups.
15 As technology development and diffusion are
endogenous to an innovation system, and as incentives form an important part in the
working of an innovation system, it is undoubtedly so that a set of important issues
have been raised.
Yet, we will argue that the perception of Sweden as an industrially under-utilised
‘academic powerhouse’ is somewhat exaggerated. We will not only argue that there
are methodological problems involved in using both R&D expenditure and
publication data but also that more recent data on the performance of Swedish
industry may lead to a somewhat different picture of the current state of industry than
what is reflected in the literature referred to above.
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As Sörlin and Törnqvist (2000) note, the share of publicly financed R&D that is
undertaken in the academic sector is unusually high in Sweden. In countries such as
Germany and the US, much R&D is performed in various types of institutes. We
would expect that the R&D pursued in such institutes does not only result in
immediately useful technology. Work of a more basic character as well as academic
publishing is clearly not solely done at Universities. For instance, in Germany, both
basic and applied work is done, and papers are published in the field of solar cells, by
academics working in various institutes (e.g. Fraunhofer Institute in Freiburg and
ISET in Kassel). In the US, public laboratories pursue basic research, and are similar
to academic departments in many ways (Bozeman, 2000). If we are to assess the
competence base which lies beyond industry, and which may be a source of both new
technology, trained people and firms,
17 we ought not to leave these parts of the ‘non-
business’ R&D sector out of the analysis.
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Unfortunately, available data do not cover many countries but a comparison can be
made with both Germany and Japan. Academic R&D in Science and Technology as
well as total R&D (in Science and Technology) in academia, government and
institutes are set out in relation to GDP in table 1. We can observe that Sweden
greatly outperforms the other two countries in terms of academic R&D.  However, the
picture alters if we also include R&D carried out in government and institutes. Indeed,18
Japan performs better and Germany is very close to the Swedish position. The picture
of the superior strength of Swedish ‘non-business’ R&D largely disappears.
19
Table 1
R&D in Science and Technology per GDP in academia and outside industry in
Sweden, Germany and Japan, 1995
R&D/GDP in academia R&D/GDP outside industry*
Country
Sweden 0.0061 0.0072
Germany  0.0033 0.0064
Japan 0.0039 0.0078
* R&D undertaken in academia, in institutes, and in government
Source: Elaboration on OECD (2000), table 7 and OECD (2000a), Annexe 1A.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Methodological problems also exist in the interpretation of publication data. The bulk
of Swedish publications (about 85 per cent, see Vinnova, 2001) refer to the life
science field while other fields are less strong. This dominance reflects a societal
choice to enhance the knowledge base of the health care system, but it is also a
reflection of the requirement of writing a thesis, with associated publications, for
doctors to be promoted to consultants. Hence, the learning process of doctors is
reflected in published articles, which is not the case in many other countries, e.g.
Britain. We may therefore, and this is the first problem, reduce the Swedish figures
accordingly.
A second problem lies in the existence of an English language bias in the journals
employed to build up bibliometric databases. This bias can be strong, indeed as much
as a 50 per cent increase in the propensity to publish can be seen in countries which19
have English as the first language (Pavitt, 1998, citing Lattimore and Revesz, 1996).
English is, of course, not the first language in Sweden, but the small northern
European countries simply have to adopt English as a working language due to a
small domestic ‘scientific market’. This means that Swedes are expected to be more
likely to publish in the English language journals than researchers from larger, non-
English speaking countries. We would therefore expect that an English language bias
applies to a certain extent to the Swedish data. Both these factors exaggerate the
Swedish strength, although by how much is not possible to say without further
enquiries. A brief comparison with Germany may, however, be suggestive. As
mentioned above (table 1), the Swedish and German R&D/GDP is broadly the same if
we include R&D undertaken in institutes and government, but in terms of number of
publications set in relation to GDP, Sweden is nearly twice as ‘productive’
(Henrekson and Rosenberg, 2000, figure 3.1). Unless we have good reasons to expect
that Swedish scientists are superior to the German (which seems difficult to argue), a
reliance on publication data would be dangerous.
Much of the discussion on industry-academia relations implicitly refers to the
engineering field. This provides the knowledge base for the bulk of new start-ups
(Rickne and Jacobsson, 1999) as well as for the bulk of the high tech industry
(Jacobsson et al., 2001) (with the exception of the pharmaceutical industry).
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Scrutinizing publication data for the engineering sector, (table 2), we can discern the
strength of Swedish academia, but, again, Sweden is not so outstanding as might be
thought at first glance. Indeed, in terms of numbers of publications per capita, Sweden
is one of several countries in a group that trails behind Israel (and at about the same
level as Canada, Finland, Switzerland and the UK).20
Table 2
The relative strength of Swedish engineering research, as measured by number
of published articles (1994-1998) divided by (million of) population (1997)
Country Total ICT** Biotechnology*
Israel 891 223 24
Switzerland 836 154 51
Sweden 768 125 40
Canada 723 157 35
Finland 644 132 37
UK 634 135 32
Netherlands 572 115 38
US 559 131 16
Australia 543 111 20
Denmark 461  87 46
Belgium 444 108 26
Japan 416  95 19
France 412  75 24
Germany 398  69 17
Austria 352  58 25
Italy 271  68  9
* including molecular biology
** includes ‘Computer Science & Engineering’, ‘Electrical & Electronic Engineering’ and
‘Information Technology & Communications Systems’
Source: Bibliometric data on the number of articles published per country was kindly
made available by Dr. O. Persson; Population data was taken from OECD (2000).
Looking at Sweden’s performance in separate knowledge fields within engineering,
we can note that Sweden ranks only no. 9 in Computer Science & Engineering
21 and
no. 7 in ICT in total.
22 The late build-up of Swedish research (the expansion in the
number of professorial chairs started only in the second half of the 1980s (Jacobsson,
1997) obviously still plagues the area in Sweden. Curiously enough, it is in ICT that
Swedish industry gained a very strong position in association with the expansion of
the mobile telephony sector in the 1990s. Indeed, two out of three patent classes
where Sweden increased its share of world patenting in the 1990s as compared to the
1980s, were in ICT, medical electronics and telecommunications (Persson, 2000, table
10); the trade performance is impressive and the number of start-ups in mobile
internet is very high. The case of ICT clearly then exhibits signs of a technological
and industrial success (so far) in spite of a relatively weak university sector, i.e. a
situation which is the opposite of that portrayed in the literature referred to above!21
In biotechnology (including molecular biology), Sweden ranks as no. 3 but the next
three countries are close behind. In terms of start-ups, patenting and trade, there is a
lot which points to good performance. Although it is difficult to clearly define the
borders of a biotechnology, available evidence suggests that Sweden has a fair
number of start-ups (Vinnova, 2001); Sweden increased its share of world patenting
in pharmaceuticals in the 1990s (although not in biotechnology, see Persson, 2000),
and the industrial and trade performance is very impressive.
In conclusion, there are important methodological issues involved in measuring the
strength and performance of the academic sector, problems that would appear to have
exaggerated the relative strength of R&D undertaken in Swedish academia. There are
also problems involved in relating the performance of academia to a set of indicators
of a supposedly poor industrial transformation (in this case number of start-ups and
the production and trade performance of the high tech sector). The case for focussing
on a poor exploitation of academic research in Sweden does not seem as strong as
may be thought at first glance.
Yet, that literature has pointed us in the direction of analysing governance and
incentive structures and how they influence the functioning of the innovation system.
In spite of the discussion above, it is clear that the generation and exploitation of
knowledge in biotechnology and in pharmaceuticals is not without problems in
Sweden. Indeed, the study by Rickne (2000) suggests that there is room for much
improvement in the Swedish technological system for biomaterials, as does the
evidence massed in Carlsson (2002) and by Vinnova (2001) for biotechnology in
general. Nor do we argue that there is not room for improvement in the electronics
sector. Indeed, as was shown above, and which will be elaborated on below,
Sweden’s academic response to the opportunities in ICT was late in terms of
developing the required capabilities. But rather than match data on academic input
and output with indicators of industrial transformation, with results which are difficult
to interpret, we suggest that it would be more useful to learn about how capabilities
are formed in the academic sector and how these are exploited (if at all) through
various mechanisms and in different knowledge fields, as discussed in section two
(and as suggested in section six).22
Science policy shapes the formation of these capabilities. In the next section, we will
discuss how a range of sources of uncertainty makes it very hard to assess the value of
academic R&D and what risks there may be with a policy that emphasises
‘demonstrated applicability’. In section five, we will deal with the ‘responsiveness’ of
academia to new opportunities. Part of that process is influenced by governance
structures, and incentives associated with these.
4. Assessing the value of academic R&D
4.1 Introduction
There is a growing pressure for ‘accountability’ in the public funding for academic
R&D (Pavitt, 2001; Geuna, 2001; Benner and Sandström, 2000). Scientific benefits of
research need to be supplemented with an identification of possible practical benefits
and academia is encouraged to, and forced to, work with, and gain funding from,
industrial partners. Accountability necessarily involves showing convincing evidence
of the benefits of R&D. This can be done either ex-post, where benefits are
demonstrated for R&D that has already been carried out, or ex-ante, which involves
an assessment of the future benefits of R&D.
There are very considerable problems concerned with measuring benefits in ex ante
evaluations. Evaluations that attempt to assess the ‘usefulness’ of the R&D in terms of
applicability, necessarily run up against a whole set of problems with respect to
uncertainties related to both technology and markets. These uncertainties will be
largely resolved by the time an ex-post evaluation takes place, although this is
dependent on the time scale involved in the evaluation process. In this section, we will
discuss both cases, beginning with the ex post case. A greater emphasis will be put on
the ex-ante case, given its greater relevance for the current debate,23
4.2 Measuring the usefulness of science ‘ex-post’
A large literature has tried to measure the usefulness of science, ex-post. Many
different methodological approaches have been used:
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•  Production functions (e.g. Autant-Bernard, 2001),
•  Counting spin-offs (e.g. Rickne, 2000, Lindholm-Dahlstrand, 1999),
•  Bibliometric and patent analyses (e.g. Godin and Gingras,  2000; McMillan et al.
2000, Hicks et al., 2001),
•  Interview techniques (e.g. Faulkner and Senker, 1994),
•  Questionnaire (e.g. Mansfield and Lee, 1996)
•  Cartography (Sörlin and Törnkvist, 2000).
Given our broad framework it comes as no surprise that, methodologically, it can be
expected to be extremely difficult to trace the impact of academic research on
industry, i.e. to make an ex-post evaluation of academic R&D. Clearly, the benefits of
academic research cannot be measured using one or two mechanisms but need to
cover all mechanisms. More importantly, the often indirect and subtle links between
academic R&D and industry create very considerable problems for tracing the
benefits of an interaction. For instance, how can the importance of sharing tacit
knowledge through informal networks be assessed? How can we trace the impact of
research on industry through the quality of undergraduate and graduate training? Not
only is measurement extremely difficult but the contribution to functionality and the
mechanisms through which these benefits may accrue to industry clearly vary
between knowledge fields which means that, as Salter and Martin (2001, p. 527), put
it: “… no simple model of the economic benefits from basic research is possible…”
Furthermore, the time frame involved in retrospective studies may be very long
indeed, and the judgement of the success or failure of a particular research programme
may well depend on the specific time frame used. For instance, the German Federal
Government spent 2 billion DM on solar cell research, primarily at universities and
institutes between 1975 and 1999, but the German stock of solar cells was only 67
MW in 1999 (Jacobsson, et al., 2002). Is this a failure or do we need to wait another24
10 or 20 years before we evaluate (anything else in this case would be unreasonable)?
Clearly, the cut-off point may have a decisive impact on the outcome of an evaluation.
The time scale involved presents us with an additional methodological problem,
namely if we are to understand the role of universities in the formation of new
innovation systems, we are speaking of mapping processes which span over decades
and where (as mentioned above) the mechanisms involved are many and difficult to
trace. Methodological ingenuity and pluralism is, therefore, required in a study of how
universities influence technical change.
4.2 Measuring the usefulness of science ‘ex ante’
It goes without saying that there may be large uncertainties of a technical nature in a
R&D project. We will not focus on such uncertainties but rather on those that remain
after the new knowledge is transformed into an innovation (when it is first applied),
uncertainties which need to be resolved if we are to expect any sort of conventional
‘rationality’ in measuring the usefulness of science ex-ante. Inspired by Rosenberg’s
(1996) superb article on ‘Uncertainty and Technological Change’, we will discuss a
set of sources of uncertainties which may lead to an inability to anticipate the future
impact of an innovation and, therefore, of estimating the social value of the research
leading to that innovation. There are at least four such  sources which need to be
considered.
First, the innovation often has a poor price/performance ratio and it takes a whole
series of ‘secondary’ innovations (Schmookler, 1966) to make it suitable for various
applications. However, initial poor performance properties may be such that it is not
obvious where these applications would be. There are a large number of anecdotes
revealing a fully justifiable narrow view of the potential of a new technology. For
instance, Marconi, who invented the radio, did not see it as an instrument of
broadcasting but one of point-to-point communication where wired communication
was not possible (Rosenberg, 1996). These problems are compounded by the fact that
many applications eventually turn out to be in a different industry than that which
originally applied the new technology. For instance, the steam engine was for a long
time considered exclusively as a pump, as it was invented to drain flooded mines25
(Rosenberg, 1996). The inter-sectoral diffusion is, of course, extremely difficult to
predict, as the case of laser clearly demonstrates, with an ever-widening area of
application over a period of more than 30 years.
A recent case in point is computer science, as revealed in the excellent study on
government support for computing research in the US (Computer Science and
Telecommunications Board, 1999, 150-151) and which is worth quoting at some
length:
“Scientific and technological research explores the unknown; hence its outcomes
cannot be predicted at the start - even if a clear, practical goal motivates the work. In
fact, outcomes anticipated at the start of a research project can differ from those
eventually achieved or that prove to be most important. The Internet is a case in point.
DARPA’s early interest in packet-switched networks…grew from a desire to use
more efficiently the computing capabilities that were distributed among its many
contractor sites. By allowing remote access to these disparate computers in a seamless
fashion, DARPA program managers hoped to expand the number of researchers who
could use them and increase their utilization rates. These results were achieved in the
end, but, as the ARPANET was subsumed into the NSFNET, which later evolved into
Internet, the range of applications for packet-switched networks expanded in a
number of unanticipated directions. Few could have predicted the popularity of
electronic mail as a means of communication…still fewer could have anticipated the
emergence of World Wide Web…”
Second, uncertainties with respect to the future impact of an innovation, arise from
the emergence of other innovations in the form of competing designs (Utterback,
1994) as well as from improvements in existing technologies (Rosenberg, 1996). It is
extremely difficult to correctly forecast which competing design will eventually
dominate the market, and uncertainties may prevail over a long period of time. For
instance, in the case of solar cells, crystalline silicon cells have been challenged for
more than a decade by amorphous silicon, cadmium telluride and copper-indium-
selenide cells. Science policy makers have had to accept that they cannot predict
which of these will dominate, and funding is now given to a variety of design
approaches (Jacobsson et al. 2002). It is even more difficult to know whether or not
any of these design approaches will eventually out-compete the incumbent crystalline
silicon cells, as much effort is being mobilised to improve its price/performance in the
face of competition by these designs.
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Third, rarely is a new technology useful on its own but requires the development of
complementary technology(ies). For instance, the use of fibre optics in
telecommunication required the development of laser technology (Granberg, 1988).
Indeed, major technological innovations, i.e. ones which have, in the end, a very high
social value, often form a vital part of a new technical system comprising a whole
range of technologies which need to evolve for the value of the initial innovation to
materialise.
As mentioned above, the time scale involved in the whole process of diffusion may be
very long. This is especially so when whole new technical systems are concerned
(Rosenberg, 1996) – it took, for instance, many decades to develop all the applications
for electricity after Faraday discovered electromagnetic induction in 1831 (Rosenberg,
1996) and fifty years after the first computer, we are still not at the end of the ICT
revolution. A lengthy period between an innovation and its full impact is also
common at the level of the individual innovation. The first solar cell was developed in
the 1950s and yet the diffusion process has only just started (Jacobsson et al., 2002).
The first numerically controlled machine tool was produced in the mid 1950s, while a
large-scale diffusion (after a number of secondary innovations particularly related to
ICT) only began in the second half of the 1970s (Jacobsson, 1986). The competence
base in microwave antenna technology in Western Sweden began to develop in the
1950s, driven by the needs of Onsala Space Observatory, but the economic returns
only began to come in the 1990s when the knowledge base could be exploited in the
booming mobile telephone business. This application was not, of course, perceived in
the 1950s and was, again, dependent on a whole range of complementary innovations
in ICT (Holmen, 2001).
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Fourth, a further complicating factor for policy makers is that the economic benefits
of academic R&D that accrue to the national, or regional, economy depend on the
functioning of the entire technological system. This introduces yet another uncertainty
where it is quite plausible that high class academic R&D is pursued in a knowledge
field for which the receiver competence of industry is underdeveloped (Salter el al.,
2000), or where the incentives for, or interest in, exploiting the new technology are
poor (Henrekson and Rosenberg, 2000). The economic benefits of academic R&D
may therefore not materialise, or may do so abroad.27
This is clearly the case of Swedish academic research in some renewable energy
technologies, which so far has found little application in Sweden for reasons found
outside of academia (Johnson and Jacobsson, 2001). Again, it is hard, or even
impossible, to predict the evolution of the technological system,
26 in part because
serendipities abound here. For instance, in the case of microwave antenna technology
referred to above, Ericsson’s decision to move a factory for military electronics to
Gothenburg (in part to get it as far away as possible from the threat of Russian
bombers) was a crucial step in forming a local technological system, which eventually
became very successful (Holmen, 2001).
Uncertainty goes, therefore, far beyond technical feasibility at the level of an
individual invention. Indeed, the use of the term uncertainty may not be fully
appropriate. A more appropriate term is ‘ignorance’ as decision makers simply cannot
have access to either the full range of potential outcomes, or the probability
distribution with respect to those which can be identified (Rosenberg, 1996). In a
situation of ignorance, quantifying the expected benefits of academic R&D does not
seem to be possible and, hence, there is no reason to believe that choice can be
‘rational’ (Rosenberg, 1996, Computer Science and Telecommunications Board,
1999).
Another, and more promising, way of thinking about the value of research is that it
generates options (Scott et al., 2001). Clearly, science generates options in the form of
new knowledge, but as argued above, the value of such options cannot really be
expected to be ascertained, even in terms of orders of magnitude. Instead, in an
uncertain and complex world, the main justification for academic research would
instead lie in building capabilities, which embody the ability to generate, and
eventually, to contribute to the realisation of (some of) these options, most of which
are unknown at the point of decision to develop a capability, but some which can
perhaps be imagined.
27 As Loasby (1998, p. 144) argues:
“ Capabilities are the least definable kinds of productive resources. They are in large
measure a by-product of past activities, but what matters at any point in time is the
range of future activities which they make possible. What gives this question its
salience is the possibility of shaping capabilities, and especially of configuring28
clusters of capabilities, in an attempt to make some preparation for future events,
which, though not predictable, may…be imagined” (our italics)
The main benefit of science is therefore that it generates capabilities so that society
can create and respond to new opportunities; i.e. support for academic research is, as
Salter and Martin (2001, p. 528) put it: “…an investment in a society’s learning
capabilities.” This is why it is so important to integrate PhD education with research
and this is why research should also be integrated with advanced undergraduate
education.
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This is also why, as Pavitt (2000) phrases it: ‘good science is useful science’;
capabilities generated through pursuing good science are socially useful. The US
achievement in science-based technologies is partly based on research and institutions
that are ranked highly by pure academic standards (Pavitt, 2001, p. 19), where first
class capabilities are generated. 
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The main challenge for Science Policy is to make sure that capabilities are built in
terms of volume, variety and quality. Failing to meet this challenge will imply that the
profitability of firms’ investment in R&D will be adversely affected. The current
emphasis on demonstrated applicability and commercial value of research
30 risks not
only to be at odds with the fundamental uncertainties of the innovation and diffusion
process, but may also lead to a Science Policy which may not manage that
challenge.
31 It is easy to point to three real risks involved in demanding that
applicability should be demonstrated (i.e. of a science policy with an emphasis on
short term usefulness in terms of the codified information coming out of research).
First, incremental improvements, and applications of what already is known, would
exhibit lower uncertainties and it would, therefore, tend to be easier to pinpoint its
benefits than the expected benefits of ventures into the truly unknown. Knowledge
production and the associated training of PhDs, i.e. capability generation, may
therefore become biased in favour of less path-breaking work, i.e. in that process, the
quality of the capabilities may suffer.
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Second, given the uncertainties discussed above, rigorously applied, a demand for
applicability would mean that capabilities in new fields, with gestation periods of
decades, simply would not be developed, i.e. Science Policy may fail to deliver in
terms of variety.
Third, taking ‘demonstrated applicability’ to the extreme, may lead to a selection of
‘bad science,’ which is pursued in the ‘right’ area and such science is, of course,
useless.
The emphasis on ‘demonstrated applicability’ thus risks biasing the capabilities
formed at the expense of quality and variety. The dangers to society are multiplied by
the expectation that the ability of academia to contribute to society in all remaining
mechanisms (see section 2.3) is dependent on the quality and variety of the
capabilities generated.
5. Improving the value of the academic sector; ‘responsiveness’,
science and educational policy and governance structures of the
university sector
A science policy where the generation of capabilities is the central issue, needs to be
concerned with the speed and strength by which universities explore new fields. The
‘response’ capacity has implications not only for the generation of specific options
and capabilities in the form of e.g. PhDs, but also for the ability to develop new
undergraduate programmes and to expand them as and when a new knowledge field
has matured enough to be applied widely in society. We will first discuss this capacity
in research and then turn to the education of engineers and scientists. In doing so, we
will elaborate on the challenge of science and educational policy to build capabilities
in terms of volume, variety and quality.
a) ‘Responsiveness’ in research
In the Swedish case, one can point to both ICT and to biotechnology as cases where a
response capacity did not develop as one might perhaps have wished. Indeed, in the
1970s and 1980s, an external agent, the Swedish Board for Technical Development30
(STU), intervened in the research systems of ICT and genetic engineering. STU
played a major role in developing these new knowledge fields by financing new
professorships and graduate programmes (Jacobsson, 1997; Carlsson and Jacobsson,
1997; Vinnova, 2002).
Achieving a high degree of responsiveness in research – i.e. maintaining or increasing
variety and increasing volumes in new knowledge fields - may be obstructed by a
whole range of factors, residing both outside of and within the universities. We may
point to five reasons.
First, new professorships (with governmental funding) have always been created by
the government. This has made the development of a new knowledge field highly
dependent on the perception of the future (how the future is imagined) among a
limited number of policy makers and bureaucrats.
Second, as argued by Benner and Sandström (2000), where scientists dominate a
research-funding organisation, these may simply not accept competition from a new
scientific area. In biotechnology, Benner and Sandström (2000) point to the reluctance
of the traditional research councils (with the exception of the Engineering Science
Research Council) to fund work in this new field and it was largely up to a new
Strategic Foundation (and to NUTEK, formerly STU) to build the new field.
Third, industry may not act in favour of research in areas which have little relevance
for their current business. Present activities constrain how the future is imagined with
the consequence that current dominant industrial sectors may shape the capability
generation in a conservative way. Granberg and Stankiewicz (1981, p. 51, our
translation) wrote 20 years ago about new technologies such as enzyme technology,
genetic engineering and microelectronics:
“Nothing has been revealed in our study which points to industry pressing these
cases…one is struck in this context by the inertia by which the electronics related base
technologies were introduced into the Swedish higher educational system. Today,
industry is very conscious of the unfortunate in this development.”31
A more recent example is that of the Internet, where a recent study concludes that
(Odhnoff and Hamngren, 2002, p. 5, our translation):
“If KTH and the other technical universities had waited for the leaders of the Swedish
telecommunications industry to wake up to the importance of Internet, Sweden would
have definitely lagged behind. Now there was a response to what was happening in
the US, which gave a reasonable point of departure when the Swedish
telecommunications industry belatedly jumped on the Internet bandwagon.”
Fourth, factors within the universities may contribute to inertia. When research is
fully ‘curiosity driven,’ it is to be expected that researchers, of some standing at least,
follow international scientific trends. However, for various reasons management may
not be able to expand research very forcefully into new fields. For instance, for
internal ‘political’ reasons, it may prolong the life of outdated knowledge fields.
There may also be obstacles to developing technologies that rely on an integration of
organisationally separate knowledge fields. A more important reason today, however,
is probably that management has very little resources to play with, of which much is
committed to supporting undergraduate and graduate teaching in useful knowledge
fields.
Take the Swedish case, where only about one third of the research funds in technical
sciences come in the form of fixed funding (SCB, 2001, table 10). These resources are
supposed to cover essential research needed to support teaching, by both lecturers and
professors; the cost of teaching PhD students and the cost of PhD students taking
courses (PhD students in the technical sciences in Sweden are normally paid a proper
salary and along with these come all sorts of overhead costs).
A rough calculation suggests that the fixed funds given to the technical sciences cover
these costs, but not much more.
33 Of the 1 152 million SEK received in the form of
fixed funding less than 400 remained for research which went beyond supporting
teaching. This sum should then be set in relation to the external funding of over 2
billion SEK (SCB, 2001, table 10). Hence, the freedom to manoeuvre for management
is probably very limited.
 Indeed, the paucity of fixed funding might even limit the
ability of the universities to respond to international scientific trends without relying
on the funding decisions of external actors.
34 To the extent that these are limited in
their images of the future, for instance by relying too much on the expressed demand32
from dominant industrial businesses, a slow response to international scientific
developments may occur. This suggests that, today, an analysis of responsiveness and
inertia must include the functioning of external funding agencies (and how they
imagine the future) and this is the fifth source of inertia.
In the Swedish case, a smaller sum (258 million SEK in 1999, see SCB, 2001, table
10) was available from the Swedish Research Council for Engineering Sciences,
which is a traditional peer-controlled research council. Many (or most) of the
remaining funders are concerned with the applicability of research. Apart from the
European Union and firms (together 405 million SEK), substantial funds are
contributed by NUTEK, Vinnova and the Foundation for Strategic Research. NUTEK
was the largest funder of technical research, but after a reorganisation in the mid
1990s, it lost one third of its resources and it has moved to finance near market R&D
(Benner and Sandström, 2000). Yet more resources were lost when a new
organisation, Vinnova, was recently founded, financing ‘user motivated research and
development’. Finally, the Foundation for Strategic Research was founded in 1993,
which combines a selection of knowledge fields with good prospects for industrial
applications (e.g. microelectronics and combustion science) with the funding of
graduate schools, i.e. it funds PhD research in selected fields (Benner and Sandström,
2000). Whereas the emphasis on applied work is not in itself a problem in the
technical sciences (as will be argued more below), the strong bias in favour of
external funders raises fundamental questions about how knowledge fields are
selected and, as a consequence, how the quantity and variety of capabilities are
shaped. It also raises questions about the selection of problems to be researched and
the quality of the capabilities.
Of course, these five potential sources of inertia do not work independently but would
be expected to tend to reinforce each other. This would suggest that agents which are
not only external to the universities and the traditional science councils (which is the
common argument), but which also, to a certain extent, act independently of current
dominant industrial businesses may have a key role to play in creating a
‘responsiveness’.33
A case in point
35 is the research programme ‘Digital Communication’, which started
in 1987, as a part of a very large technology policy programme in ICT. It built on
earlier smaller programmes in digital radio technology but in the early 1980s, industry
(i.e. Ericsson and Telia) feared that the knowledge base in digital communication
would be too small to support industry in the second generation mobile telephony
which they knew would be digital. Industry, academia and STU (the predecessor of
NUTEK) had intense consultations where for instance, the Director for Research of
Ericsson Radio Systems wrote in 1987 (Vinnova, 2002, p. 20, our translation):
“The second generation mobile telephony will be digital…Sweden is playing a
leading role in this development…for Ericsson Radio System it is vital that STU give
priority to a framework programme in digital mobile radio.”
The programme combined scientific excellence with an orientation towards a broader
knowledge field in which a small but expanding part of Swedish industry (otherwise
dominated by mechanical engineering) articulated a need for PhDs with capabilities
which could be employed to develop systems according to GSM standards. As fresh
funding was made available, and an initial competence had earlier been built up on a
smaller scale, universities responded quickly by expanding PhD education in this
field.
The US experience also clearly suggests that massive government support to develop
a specific (targeted) new and broad knowledge field can be very successful. Federal
support was, for example, exceedingly important for the development of the computer
science field. In a study cited above, this support was summarized as follows
(Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, 1999, p. 136):
“…federal support has accounted for a substantial fraction of the total funding for
computing research …and the vast majority of all university research funds in the
field. Such funding has supported both the development of new technologies and the
training of students. The federal government has also paid for public research
infrastructure, providing most of the funds for research equipment in the university
department of computer science and electrical engineering, and has sponsored
programs to provide access to and infrastructure for high-performance computing and
networking.”
The success lies not only in the early timing and the large amounts of funding but also
in how the support was given. Two lessons are especially pertinent in this context.34
First, the programme managers had a ‘light touch’ in that they did not select specific
R&D problems to be pursued by academia:
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“This style of funding and management resulted in government stimulating innovation
with a light touch, allowing researchers room to pursue new areas of enquiry” (ibid, p.
11) and “This reality counters the myth that government bureaucrats heavy-handedly
selected R&D problems…” (Ibid, p. 102).
Second, handling the inherent uncertainties in an evolving new field (see section 3)
required high competence and flexibility from funding organisations:
“Researchers need sufficient intellectual freedom to follow their intuition and to
modify research plans based on preliminary results. Constraining research too
narrowly can limit their ability and willingness to take risks in choosing new research
directions. Building such flexibility into federal structures for managing research
requires both skilled program managers – who understand, articulate and promote the
visions of researchers – and an organizational culture that accepts and promotes
exploratory efforts (ibid, p. 151).
Hence, targeting the new broad field was combined with a great deal of intellectual
freedom; applied work should therefore not be confused with ‘demonstrated
applicability.’
Indeed, practical concerns, but not always those of immediate relevance to industry
today, clearly often guide academic research. As Rosenberg and Nelson (1994, p. 332,
340) argue:
“…a widely accepted definition of basic research has come to focus on the absence of
concern with practical applications rather than the search for a fundamental
understanding of natural phenomena. This is unfortunate, indeed bizarre…we do not
mean that such research is not guided by practical concerns…it is a gross
misconception to think that if research is ‘basic’ this means the work is not motivated
by or funded because of its promise to deal with a class of practical problems. Nor
does it mean that university scientists and engineers are not building and working
with prototypes of applicable industrial technology. Indeed this is a central part of
academic research in many engineering fields.”
The motivation to solve practical problems cannot be seen better than in institutes of
technology (e.g. MIT and NJIT in the US, Chalmers and KTH in Sweden), which
were built up to support industry and where undergraduate and graduate education is35
closely linked to industry. This is evident simply by looking at the names of the
various departments (e.g. energy technology, combustion engineering etc) and how
these have changed over the years. Granberg and Stankiewicz (1981, p.21) clearly
point this out when they suggest, “ as a reasonable generalisation, it can be said that
the needs of industry strongly guide the creation and orientation of new engineering
departments (our translation)”.
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In the Swedish context, the applied nature of the science base is especially
pronounced where the combined share of engineering and medicine (also very
concerned with solving practical problems) is particularly high (Pavitt, 2001). The
perception of what engineering schools, and probably schools of medicine, do, as well
as their degree and types of interaction with industry, seems to be somewhat at odds
with that in the ‘triple helix’ literature. For instance, Benner and Sandström (2000, p.
293) summarize that perception as follows:
38
“The academic system focussed on fundamental research, organized along
disciplinary boundaries, and had only limited and mediated contacts with politics and
industry…now with the second industrial revolution…academic research is pursued
with openness towards practical applications and commercial exploitation of
academic research”.
However, whereas much academic work is applied, given the range of sources of
inertia listed above, a considerable space in the funding system is justified for
organisations which assemble and articulate needs from emerging segments of
industry for new capabilities. A substantial share of directed research is therefore a
necessary and useful element in a Science Policy
39, but only as long as it is directed
towards newer and broadly defined fields and it is combined with high scientific
standards and the development of capabilities at the doctorate and other levels.
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b) ‘Responsiveness’ in terms of education
The Swedish higher educational system (HES) used to be highly centralised where the
Department of Education controlled the volume and orientation of undergraduate
education in great detail. For instance, when Chalmers University of Technology
wanted to start a course in Computer Science, they had to apply for permission from,
and bargain about funding with, the Department of Education. Since the early or mid-
1990s, central government only controls the volume of education by allocating a
number of student places to each university. These may then reallocate the places
between various subjects. This has opened up the possibility for a university to
develop new fields without any central approval.
Yet, a restriction on the total number of student places sets a de facto restriction on
local flexibility, as an expansion in one field will have to be made at the expense of
another field. For instance, an excess demand for engineers with a knowledge in
microwave technology has existed for some time in Western Sweden, but if the
School of Electronics were to have satisfied this demand, it would have led to a sharp
reduction in the graduation of electronics engineers with other specialities, or to the
reduction in the supply of engineers in computer science or mechanical engineering.
This meant that a ceiling on the number of students learning microwave technology
was set, a ceiling which was far below the demand for such engineers in the region
(Holmen, 2001).
In other cases, new degrees have been implemented at the expense of ‘old’ areas. One
example is ‘technical design’ which was developed at the expense of study places in
mechanical engineering.  An improved opportunity, although still constrained, thus
exists to develop new degrees. This situation could be contrasted with that in the US,
which is characterised by decentralisation and an autonomy to act, which is likely to
lead to a greater ability to balance demand and supply (Henrekson and Rosenberg,
2000).
Henrekson and Rosenberg (2000) also point to the dangers of the Swedish practice of
separating research and undergraduate education, which has probably led to a slower
incorporation of new findings into teaching. This is extremely important as, as was37
argued above, one of the main mechanisms by which research affects industry is
through teaching at various levels. Indeed, ensuring that researchers are involved in
undergraduate and graduate education is, therefore, of fundamental importance.
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The responsiveness of the whole university system is, however, not only dependent on
the balance between centralised and decentralised decision making, or to factors
within a specific university. Take the case of education in ICT in Sweden where a
poor responsiveness could be easily discerned, at least compared to the US
(Jacobsson, 1997; Jacobsson et al., 2001). In Sweden, the number of electronics
engineers and computer scientists graduating per capita (at the BSc and MSc levels),
was well below that of the US until the mid 1990s, and there was a persistent excess
demand for study places. Whereas Henrekson and Rosenberg (2000) attribute this
pattern, in a convincing way, to the greater decentralisation and to a different
incentive structure in the US, Jacobsson et al. (2001) also point to the structure of the
Swedish HES until the 1990s as an important explanatory factor. Sweden’s ‘catching-
up’ in the mid 1990s was primarily
42 due to the introduction of a two tier educational
system in Sweden, which expanded access to higher education very significantly.
Such a system has long been in place in the US, while in California, there is even a
three tier one (Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1997).
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Yet a third factor to consider is the role of agents, external to the university. We saw
above the central role played by the Federal Government (in part channelled through
the Department of Defence), in building up the whole knowledge field of computer
science in the US, thereby enabling an early start in teaching in that field (Rosenberg,
2000). Hence, in seeking explanations to varying degrees of ‘responsiveness’, it is not
only governance forms that appear to matter but also how the non-market based
educational system is dimensioned and structured as well as the role of external
agents in building up competence in new fields.
Finally, as would be expected in an innovation system approach, it would be a grave
mistake, particularly in the engineering field, to neglect the influence of timing, and
the strength with which industry articulates its demand for new educational
orientations (and volumes of graduates). As Granberg and Stankiewicz (1981, p.47)
point out,38
“The present or expected demand from industry of engineers with certain competence
profile controls in an obvious way the creation of new Chairs…However, it is a
matter of control which primarily affects the educational functions.”
A poor responsiveness could, therefore, be contributed to by industry, if it fails to
articulate a demand for new competence in good time. Clearly, one may imagine a
situation where a failure by the current industry to articulate the needs of the industry
of the future exacerbates other causes of inertia resulting in a vicious circle. Sweden
was probably a case in point in the 1970s and 1980s in the field of electronics and
computer science (Jacobsson, 1997). A poor responsiveness would in such a case not
be defined in relation to the needs of current industry but in relation to growing
scientific and technological opportunities and the universities would need to act in a
proactive fashion and not only respond to the expressed needs of dominant industrial
actors.
6. Suggestions for further research
In this final section, we will outline some suggestions for further research. We will
start with a brief summary of our findings for science policy and continue with the
contours of a large and internationally comparative project, which may incorporate
many of the issues identified in the text. We will then point to a set of questions that
can be carried out on a smaller scale but which could also form part of the larger
project.
An appropriate science policy rests on an understanding of the following points that
have emerged in this selective review:
•  A justification of academic R&D which is based primarily on the appreciation
of the key role of the generation of capabilities, and that the main challenge
for science policy is to make sure that capabilities are built in terms of volume,
variety and quality
•  That high scientific standards and intellectual freedom are a prerequisite for,
and not an obstacle to, a rich relationship between industry and academia39
•  The dangers of biasing the formation of capabilities by emphasizing
‘demonstrated applicability’ and immediate commercial value
•  The role played by the other parts of the technological systems (e.g. the
existing industry, venture capital firms, prevailing culture, external funding
agencies) in shaping and exploiting these capabilities
•  The diversity of patterns of interaction between universities and industry,
including the determinants of that diversity. In particular, science policy
needs to grasp the importance of less visible (and more difficult to measure)
mechanisms so as to generate a complete picture of how universities
contribute to functionality. In this connection, it is necessary to distinguish
between universities of technologies and other universities.
•  The range of determinants of the responsiveness of universities in terms of
both research and education, including the usefulness of various governance
forms, the existence and behaviour of various external funding agencies and
the role of industry.
•  That a substantial share of directed research is a necessary and useful element
in a science policy, but only as long as it is directed towards newer and
broadly defined fields and it is combined with high scientific standards and
the development of capabilities at the doctorate and other levels.
In order to improve our understanding of many of these points, we can envision a
large internationally comparative project analysing
a) the evolution of specific but broadly defined knowledge fields (e.g. computer
science) in both research and education, b) the interaction of universities with
industry through all kinds of mechanisms in these fields (including an analysis of
obstacles to the proper functioning of each mechanism), c) the determinants of
these patterns, be they in the form of virtuous or vicious circles, including both
governance structure of the universities, the nature of science policy, the existence
and behaviour of external actors funding research and the nature of the
remaining components of the surrounding technological systems. The scope of the
study can vary with regard to the number of a) knowledge fields, b) countries (and
universities in each country) and c) mechanisms.40
A project of that nature would be ambitious and costly and would have to be
undertaken with different national teams using their knowledge of their respective
home bases. A way to start off such a project would be to pursue a couple of pilot
projects where the focus would be on knowledge fields of which we already have a
good overview of the respective innovation systems, knowledge which is hard to
come by. Examples of such knowledge fields are renewable energy technologies,
telematics and biotechnology. We could then analyse these at the national or regional
levels, where the analysis runs through the three stages mentioned above. This is
feasible and we would probably learn much for the design of a larger project.
In addition, we can point to a set of smaller projects which would be very useful to
pursue.
1. Whereas great progress has been made in terms of R&D statistics and
bibliometrics, there are still some methodological problems to tackle in cross-country
comparisons of the strength and performance of research undertaken outside of
industry. More specifically, we are not certain of the magnitude of the methodological
problems pointed at in section 3.
2. In a situation of ignorance about future applications of technology and its value,
there is no reason to believe that choice can be ‘rational’. In an uncertain and complex
world, the main justification for academic research would not lie in the production of
information in the shape of a public good, but instead lie in building capabilities.
Further work is required to develop a capability-based rationale for funding of
academic research.
3. Given the inherent impossibility of demonstrating applicability in more than a very
general sense, how is ‘applicability’ used by Science Policy makers to select areas for
funding and for screening projects? There are two issues which need further
elaboration. First, to what extent does the selection reflect the need of the present
dominant industrial businesses (with the risk of repeating the historical mistakes in
biotechnology and electronics), and to what extent does it reflect the need of
capabilities in emerging business areas, i.e. what is the balance between satisfying41
demand from current activities and funding capabilities in exciting, but highly
uncertain, new areas? Second, to what extent are capabilities generated in a context of
intellectual freedom and to what extent is academic research steered towards specific
questions and towards product development? In the latter case, it would be useful to
analyse the potential risks involved in (mis)shaping the capabilities by placing too
great an emphasis on ‘demonstrated applicability’. Case studies of management of
different external funding organisations would seem appropriate. These may span
over the range of funding agencies, which now exist in Sweden.
4. What is the political economy of the ‘cry for demonstrated applicability’ when it
has been shown that a) an ex-ante evaluation of the applicability is hardly possible,
except for, perhaps, incremental innovations, and b) ‘good science is useful science’?
It would be useful to learn which interest groups have shaped the agenda, the
perceptions of the innovation and growth process of these groups, and related to this,
what is the empirical substance behind the claim that universities, in particular
universities of technology, used to have little contact with industry? Little is gained
from analyses, which fail to understand the differences between universities of
technology and traditional universities.42
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1 The ‘innovation process’ includes the diffusion of technology.
2 See also Meyer-Krahmer and Schmoch (1998) on this point.
3 This paragraph, and the two following, draw heavily on Johnson and Jacobson (2001).
4 Rickne (2000) provides us with a more detailed set of functions.
5 Indeed, as pointed out long ago by Myrdal, these virtuous circles are central to a development process
- as these circles are formed, the evolution of the technological system begins to be self-sustained. He
even suggested that (Myrdal, 1957, p. 18) “ the main scientific task is…to analyse the causal inter-
relations within the system itself as it moves under the influence of outside pushes and pulls and the
momentum of its own internal processes”.
6 Take, for instance, the current debate over which policy structure is the most appropriate to promote
renewable energy, where the proponents of Green Certificates advocate that this is a superior policy
instrument compared to using fixed prices and privileged access to the market (as practised in
Germany, see Jacobsson, 2002).
7 In this, we may also include non-technology specific factors.
8 A very useful study (Rickne, 2000) compares how universities in Sweden, Massachusetts and Ohio
contributed to how these functions were performed in the case of biomaterials.
9 Faulkner and Senker (1994) specify additional mechanisms.
10 See Dasgupta and David (1994) for a discussion of this overall function of academic R&D.
11 Universities can be seen as a reservoir of knowledge, which can be drawn upon at will, as was
argued above.
12 See also Dasgupta and David (1994) on this point.
13 We would also expect that spin-offs are normally located close to their source (Lindholm-
Dahlstrand, 1999)
14 Professor Keith Pavitt kindly gave me access to this paper.
15 Rickne (2000) notes that various types of ’bridging institutions’ are much less frequent in
Massachusetts and judged to be less important by industry than in Ohio and Sweden but, even so,
Massachusetts performs better in biomaterials.
16 Henrekson and Rosenberg (2000) recognise that a somewhat different situation developed in terms of
start-ups in the 1990s and attribute that, at least in part, to changing incentives.
17 See Jacobsson et al. (2002) for a case study of how two new firms producing solar cells (Wurth Solar
and Antec) were founded by exploiting the competence base of German R&D institutes.
18 A further problem in comparing data on academic R&D across nations is that in some countries, e.g.
US and Denmark, academic teachers have time for research built into their posts whereas in others, e.g.
Sweden, lecturers have to find external funding for their research. In the former case, we would suspect
that a lot of ‘hidden’ research is undertaken.
19 In addition, as Pavitt (1998) emphasises, the output of the academic sector is a public but not a free
good and smaller countries therefore have to pay a high entrance ticket to international networks in
order to be able to draw upon the accumulated knowledge in the world. The potential of the academic
sector to contribute with new knowledge (to the world) would therefore be less than what the share in
GDP would tend to suggest for smaller countries.
20 This exception is not complete though as biotechnology is an engineering field too.
21 In other engineering fields, Sweden ranks higher. In material science, Sweden ranks as (no. 1);
nuclear engineering, (no. 2); mechanical engineering, (no. 5); Chemical engineering, (no. 8).
22 In the broader area that relies on capabilities in electronics and computer science, we find two
additional classes: ‘Artifical Intelligence, Robotics & Auto Control’ as well as
‘Instrumentation/Measurement’. In the former field, Sweden ranks as no. 7 and in the latter as no. 2.
‘Instrumentation/Measurement’ is a knowledge field in which Sweden has had strength for some time
(see Jacobsson, 1997) and the leading countries are not those which are ahead in other fields that rely
on capabilities in electronics and computer science. Switzerland ranks highest, followed by Sweden,
Finland, Netherlands, Israel and Germany.
23 None of the methods appear to be satisfactory on their own; and some may be very misleading; in
particular Meyer (2000) provides a potentially devastating critique of using citations to papers in
patents as a means of establishing local ‘spill-overs, at least with a cross country comparative
perspective.
24 An example from the case of solar cells is an improved production process for crystalline silicon
cells recently introduced by the German firm ASE.48
                                                                                                                                           
25 Computer Science and Telecommunications Board (1999) gives yet a further set of examples of the
time scale involved.
26 With respect to renewable energy technology, the strategic repositioning of ABB into such
technologies came as a great surprise for many in 2000. For a case demonstrating the unpredictability
in the evolution of a technological system, see Johnson and Jacobsson (2000).
27 I have benefited here from discussions with Brian Loasby at the 2002 DRUID Winter Conference,
Aalborg, Denmark, January 17-19
th.
28 This does not, however, mean that other benefits and mechanisms should be ignored – e.g. spin offs
to realise some options should be stimulated in the sense that these mechanisms, as the others, should
be free of obstacles.
29 Other authors underscore this view, e.g. Hicks et al. (2000) and McMillan et al. (2000) for the US
and Faulkner and Senker (1994) for the UK. For instance, Hicks et al. (2000) show that a US scientific
paper among the top 1 per cent most highly cited papers is nine times more likely to be cited by a US
patent than a randomly selected paper.
30 See Goldfarb and Henrekson (2002) for a clear case of the latter.
31 As Dasgupta and David (1994) point out there are more features of current Science Policy which
may lead to an inability to manage this challenge.
32 See Geuna (2001) for a discussion of the changing rationale for European university research
funding and an exploration of negative unintended consequences. Goldfarb and Henrekson (2002) cite
a case in biophysics and molecular biology where links to industry led to dissertations of little basic
importance. We are aware though, that not all industry funding of academic R&D restricts academic
freedom (Behrens and Gray, 2001 and Rickne 2000).
33 We calculate with 2 470 PhD students, 507 Professors and 1 014 lecturers which were the number of
fulltime equivalents in 1999 (SCB, 2001). We assume that lecturers should have 25 per cent of their
time for research to support teaching and that professors should have 35 percent. We further assume
that the students spend 20 percent of their time taking courses and that professors teach these courses.
We assume that there are ten students per course and that each student takes 2 courses per year. Giving
a PhD course is assumed to account for 10 per cent of a professor’s yearly working hours. The salaries
are assumed to be 18 000 SEK for PhD students, 36 000 for lecturers and 44 000 for professors. Social
overheads are assumed to be 54 per cent and University overheads another 50 percent. The total
estimate would come to 778 million SEK which was 71 per cent of the fixed funding for 1999
according to SCB (2001). The different cost items were as follows: professors’ and lecturers’ research
to support teaching 214 and 250 million respectively, PhD students taking courses 246 million SEK
and professors’ teaching in these courses 68 million SEK.
34 The study ‘Forskning 2000’ could be read as a ‘desperate’ attempt to address a perceived imbalance
in the structure of funding.
35 This example is based on Vinnova (2002).
36 The same lesson can be drawn from the German wind energy programme (Johnson and Jacobsson,
2001).
37 The close links between Swedish industry and the universities of technology are pointed to by Sörlin
and Törnqvist (2000).
38 Martin and Etzkowitz (2000) make a distinction between different ‘species’ of universities,
acknowledging that land grant universities in the US and technical universities are closely linked to
meeting societal needs.
39 As Rosenberg and Nelson (1994, p. 347) conclude in an influential article: “… binding university
research closer to industry, while respecting the condition that research be ‘basic’ in the sense of
aiming for understanding rather than short-run practical payoff, can be to the enduring benefit of both”.
40 In this we strongly disagree with Sörlin and Törnqvist (2000) as well as with Goldfarb and
Henrekson (2002) who argue that there may be a conflict between usefulness and scientific standards
as indicated by publishing.
41 In discussion with policy makers, I have made this point over the past decade illustrating with my
own situation. Just imagine the opportunity of being able to influence the thinking of about 100
engineering students per annum by using your own research.
42 In part, it was due to a decline in the number of graduated engineers and scientists in the US.
43 It is not clear that all tiers follow market-based solutions.